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The Cost of Collaboration: Why Joint Decision Making Exacerbates
Rejection of Outside Information
Abstract
Prior investigators have asserted that certain group characteristics cause group members to disregard outside
information and that this behavior leads to diminished performance. We demonstrate that the very process of
making a judgment collaboratively rather than individually also contributes to such myopic underweighting of
external viewpoints. Dyad members exposed to numerical judgments made by peers gave significantly less
weight to those judgments than did individuals working alone. This difference in willingness to use peer input
was mediated by the greater confidence that the dyad members reported in the accuracy of their own
estimates. Furthermore, dyads were no better at judging the relative accuracy of their own estimates and the
advisor’s estimates than individuals were. Our analyses demonstrate that, relative to individuals, dyads
suffered an accuracy cost. Specifically, if dyad members had given as much weight to peer input as individuals
working alone did, then their revised estimates would have been significantly more accurate.
Keywords
decision making, judgement, dyads, advice taking, egocentric discounting
Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations




RUNNING HEAD: COLLABORATIVE JUDGMENT 
 
 
The cost of collaboration: 
Why joint decision-making exacerbates rejection of outside information 
 
 
Julia A. Minson and Jennifer S. Mueller 
 
The Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
Word count: 2,497 
Citation count: 27 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE - ACCEPTED 
 
Correspondence:  
Julia A. Minson  
The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
3730 Walnut St.  





Existing research asserts that specific group characteristics cause members to disregard 
outside information, which leads to diminished performance. We demonstrate that the 
very process of making a judgment collaboratively rather than individually contributes to 
such myopic underweighting of external viewpoints. Dyad members exposed to the 
numerical judgments made by peers gave significantly less weight to those judgments 
than did individuals working alone. The difference in the willingness to use peer input 
shown by individuals versus dyads was mediated by the greater confidence that the dyad 
members reported in the accuracy of their own estimates. Furthermore, dyads were no 
more effective at judging relative accuracy of own and peer inputs than individuals. Our 
analyses demonstrate that relative to individuals, dyads suffered an accuracy cost.  
Specifically, had dyad members given as much weight to peer input as individuals, their 




Although most major decisions are made collaboratively, in domains as diverse as 
business, public policy, and international relations examples of poor joint judgment 
abound. And because many collaborative decision failures can be traced back to rejection 
of outside information (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992), researchers have closely investigated 
group characteristics that foster myopic disregard of alternative viewpoints (Ancona, 
1990; Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Janis, 1982; Kane, Argote, & Levine, 2005; Katz, 
1982). Whereas such research has identified several factors that increase or decrease this 
tendency (Ancona, 1990), we pose a novel question. What if the mere act of collaboration 
discourages the use of outside input?  
Research on quantitative judgment has shown that individuals often improve 
decision-making by integrating outside input in part because they can determine the 
relative accuracy of own and others’ judgments (Soll & Larrick, 2009) and in part 
because aggregating independently-made judgments reduces average error (Armstrong, 
2001; Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978). However, this work has 
exclusively focused on individual level processes (Gino & Moore, 2007; Gino & 
Schweitzer, 2008; Mannes, 2009; Soll & Mannes, 2011). While accepting advice can 
improve performance, the question of whether individuals or collaborators are more 
likely to integrate advisor input remains unanswered.   
At first blush, one might suggest that collaborative decisions would be more 
amenable to revision than individual ones. Individuals may underweight peer input 
because they are overly attached to their own views (Harvey & Harries, 2004; Lord, 
Ross, & Lepper, 1979). By contrast, because collaboration requires that individuals cede 
prior opinions to reach consensus, collaborators may be less satisfied with, and more 
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open to revising joint judgments. Additionally, collaborative judgment requires 
discussion, which might enhance decision makers’ ability to realize that the judgments of 
peers must on average be as accurate as their own.  
Alternatively, collaborators may devalue outside input more than individuals. 
Brainstorming research notes that discussion and collaboration can increase conformity 
pressures (Goncalo & Staw, 2006). Furthermore, collaborators may choose to disregard 
outside advice to preserve and reinforce feelings of cohesion and rapport (Ancona, 1990; 
Janis, 1982; Katz, 1982). However, we propose one additional possibility: namely that 
the mere act of collaborating enhances confidence, and thereby limits receptivity to 
outside advice. 
The role of confidence  
Relative to working alone, people believe that working collaboratively allows for 
greater resource acquisition, avoidance of negative outcomes, and goal achievement 
(Moreland, 1987). Collaboration increases efficacy beliefs – beliefs about a person’s 
ability to produce a desired result  – including confidence in decision-making (Forsyth, 
1999; Park & Hinsz, 2006), and beliefs about overall capability (Stroebe, Diehl, & 
Abakoumkin, 1992). We propose that the act of collaborating on a judgment task may 
promote confidence in the accuracy of the judgments produced. 
Greater confidence has previously been linked to the propensity to disregard 
outside input in the advice-taking literature (Gino & Moore, 2007; Harvey & Fischer, 
1997; Soll & Larrick, 2009). High confidence in one’s own estimates might cue that 
advice is not needed or appropriate (Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001). And while it may be 
logical to adhere to judgments one feels confident about, it would be folly to overlook the 
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fact that one’s peers might have similar reasons to feel confident. We thus hypothesize 
that collaborators will feel more confident in the accuracy of their judgments than 
individuals, and thus be less open to peer input, with deleterious effects for judgment 
accuracy.  
The benefits and costs of collaborative judgment 
 The higher confidence experienced by collaborators relative to individuals working 
alone may be partly justified. The belief that two heads are better than one has received 
substantial support from experiments in which independently-made judgments are 
combined to show the benefits of statistical aggregation (Soll & Larrick, 2009; 
Surowiecki, 2004; see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006 for a review). However, much of this 
benefit is lost when estimators influence each other’s judgments (Lorenz, Rauhut, 
Schweitzer, and Helbing, 2011). Therefore judgments made jointly may not exhibit the 
accuracy of aggregated independent judgments.   
 Even assuming that collaborators produce highly accurate initial estimates, 
collaboration may come with a cost in contexts where judgments require outside input. If 
collaborators integrate outside advice less than individuals they may lose their initial 
accuracy advantage. The magnitude of this cost becomes apparent when comparing the 
accuracy of revised collaborative estimates to the accuracy which could have been 
achieved, had collaborators yielded as much as individuals. Given that joint decision-
making requires greater human capital, money, and time, this lost accuracy is nontrivial.    
 In the present research we compare the willingness of individuals and collaborators 
to revise judgments, their confidence in those judgments, and the accuracy of the revised 
estimates. We predicted that the greater confidence resultant from making a decision 
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jointly rather than alone limits receptivity to outside advice, and lowers accuracy relative 
to what could have been achieved had dyads yielded as much as individuals. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 252) were members of a university research pool, compensated 
with $10. We offered a $30 bonus for each of two estimation rounds, which decreased by 
$1 for each percentage point any estimate deviated from the truth. 
Design  
The study featured a 2 (individual judge vs. dyad judge) x 2 (individual advisor 
vs. dyad advisor) design that allowed us to assess whether any observed differences were 
due to the identity of the judge or the identity of the advisor.  
Procedure  
During each session participants sat in a partitioned room and estimated nine 
numerical quantities related to U. S. geography, demography, and commerce. We worded 
the questions to solicit percentage estimates in order to ensure that data across items 
could be easily combined (see Table 1). 
Participants were randomly assigned to make initial estimates either individually 
or jointly through discussion with a dyad partner. They were then provided with a set of 
estimates made by another individual or dyad and given the option to revise their initial 
estimates to any degree they felt appropriate.  
Variables and analyses 
To quantify yielding to peer input for each item we determined the distance 
between participants’ and advisors’ initial estimates, and then calculated the percentage 
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of the distance participants adjusted towards their advisor’s estimate1. Following prior 
research (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), we winsorized this measure to be between 0% and 
100% and dropped from analysis the 7% of observations on which participants offered 
the same initial estimate as their advisors.  
For each item, participants reported their confidence that their estimate fell within 
10 percentage points of the answer on a five-point scale from “Not at all confident” to 
“Extremely confident.” Although all confidence ratings were made individually, in the 
dyad condition we averaged the partners’ confidence ratings to arrive at a single rating 
for each dyad for each item.  
We used hierarchical linear modeling in Stata due to the fact that each of our 
participants (whether working alone or with a partner) provided estimates for nine items. 
This approach allowed us to control for non-independence of multiple observations being 
provided by each participant while maximizing statistical power. We entered confidence 
and yielding to peer input as item-level (Level 1) variables and the two independent 
factor variables, Identity of Judge and Identity of Advisor as participant-level (Level 2) 
variables. Within each factor we coded “0” for Individual and “1” for Dyad.  
Results 
Use of peer input 
Collapsing across whether judgments were made individually or collaboratively, 
participants yielded an average of 25.8% (SD = 29.5%) to the advice of individuals and 
an average of 26.9% (SD = 30.8%) to the advice of dyads (Table 2). Thus there was no 
effect of the identity of advisor on yielding (B = .01, z = .60, ns). In line with our 
predictions, collapsing across the identity of advisor, participants working individually 
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yielded an average of 32.3% (SD = 31.1%), whereas participants working collaboratively 
yielded significantly less (M = 19.5, SD = 27.3), (B = -.12, z = -6.42, p < 0.001). There 
was no significant interaction between identity of judge and identity of advisor (B = -.01, 
z = -0.26, ns).   
The mediating role of confidence 
Participants who made estimates collaboratively were more confident in their 
initial estimates (M = 2.67, SD = 0.78) than participants who made estimates individually 
(M = 2.27, SD = 0.94), (B = 0.397, z = 4.30, p < 0.001). To demonstrate that confidence 
mediates the effect of identity of judge on use of peer input, we next tested whether 
confidence predicts yielding, entering both as item-level variables. When participants 
were more confident in their initial estimates, they yielded less (B = -.069, z = -7.14, p < 
.001).  
Finally, when we regressed yielding to peer input on identity of judge, identity of 
advisor and initial confidence, we found a significant effect of confidence (B = -.059, z = 
-6.19, p < 0.001), a significant but diminished effect of identity of judge (B = -.106, z = -
5.20, p < 0.001), and no effect of identity of advisor (B = .016, z = 0.78, ns). To test the 
significance of the indirect effect of identity of judge on yielding via confidence, we used 
the Monte Carlo bootstrapping method (Selig & Preacher, 2008). The test returned a 95% 
confidence interval for the indirect effect not containing zero (lower bound: -.04, upper 
bound: - .01), confirming that confidence significantly mediated the effect of identity of 
judge on yielding. 
Estimation Accuracy 
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We measured estimation error as absolute percentage point deviation from the 
correct answer. Participants who made their initial estimates working with a dyad partner 
showed marginally less error (M = 40.4 percentage points, SD = 0.02 percentage points) 
than participants who made their initial estimates working alone (M = 45.3 percentage 
points, SD = 0.02 percentage points), (B = -.05, z = -1.89, p = 0.06).  
Were dyads superior to individuals at giving greater weight to the more accurate 
estimates? To address this question we coded the relative accuracy of own and peers’ 
estimates (+1: own more accurate; -1: own less accurate) and entered this variable into 
our model predicting yielding, along with the two factor variables and the interactions 
terms between each factor and relative accuracy (Identity of Judge X relative accuracy, 
Identity of Advisor X relative accuracy).  
The model returned a significant effect of relative accuracy on yielding (B = -.05, 
z = -3.65, p < 0.01). When participants’ own estimates were more accurate than those of 
their peers, they yielded less, and vice versa. We again observed that dyads yielded 
significantly less than individuals (B = -.129, z = -6.42, p < 0.001), irrespective of the 
identity of advisor (B = .012, z = 0.58, ns). However, neither identity of judge nor of 
advisor interacted with relative accuracy to predict yielding (Identity of judge: B = .02, z 
= 1.45, ns; Identity of advisor: B = .018, z = 1.16, ns). Although participants across 
conditions gave greater weight to more accurate estimates than less accurate ones, dyads 
were no better at this task than individuals.  
The Cost of Collaboration 
Given that dyad members gave significantly less weight to peer input than 
individuals and were no wiser in discriminating more versus less accurate estimates, it is 
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perhaps not surprising that in offering their revised estimates they lost the small accuracy 
advantage observed in the initial estimates. Neither the identity of the judge (B = -.004, z 
= -0.18, ns), nor the identity of the advisor (B = -.02, z = -0.92, ns) significantly 
influenced the accuracy of the revised estimates. Dyads’ final estimates were no more 
accurate than those offered by individuals.  
In order to more directly assess whether dyad members paid a price for greater 
underweighting of peer input, we calculated hypothetical estimates that dyad members 
could have produced had they yielded to input as much as individuals did (i.e. an 
additional 12.8 percentage points). For each item we took the actual amount that dyad 
members yielded and calculated their accuracy had they yielded the additional distance. 
Indeed, those hypothetical revised estimates would have been significantly more accurate 
than dyads’ actual revised estimates (Dyad judge and Individual advisor: B = .02, z = 
2.68, p < 0.01; Dyad judge and Dyad advisor: B = .02, z = 3.21, p < 0.01). Thus dyad 
members in each condition paid a significant accuracy cost for failing to yield as much as 
individuals.   
Discussion 
Collaboration is not free. Greater time, money and effort go into making 
judgments together rather than alone. Often this is done on the assumption that the results 
will be superior to decisions made individually. In our study dyads were more reluctant 
than individuals to revise their judgments, and as a result their revised estimates were less 
accurate than they could have been were they more willing to accept peer input. In fact, 
in our study revised judgments made with the combined inputs of four individuals were 
no more accurate than those made with the inputs of three or even two. This 
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unwillingness to integrate peer input was explained by dyad members’ greater confidence 
in their estimates. Dyads confidence was somewhat warranted given the greater accuracy 
of their initial estimates, yet proved detrimental to the accuracy of their revised estimates. 
Furthermore, dyads were no better than individuals at identifying more accurate 
estimates.  
In prior research, feelings of confidence or efficacy have been shown to promote 
performance (Bandura, 1977). Yet, new research proposes that this may not be the case 
when individuals or groups are engaged in a novel task where feelings of high efficacy 
may inhibit the exploration that results in improved outcomes (Goncalo, Polman, & 
Maslach, 2010; Moore & Healy, 2008). The current investigation shows that confidence 
may also inhibit the extent to which decision-makers consider novel information.  
A large literature shows that knowledge transfer in organizations is difficult 
because groups are resistant to outside information (Kane et al., 2005). This prior work 
proposes that the quality of collaboration – not the mere act of collaborating, explains 
why members are reluctant to change their mind. The current study suggests that 
collaborators may resist incorporating outside input in part because the collaborative 
process itself increases confidence about the accuracy of own responses, while potentially 
minimizing some of the benefits of judgment aggregation.  
Prior research suggests that groups may be more self-attentive and disregard 
outside information due to high cohesion (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). To address this 
alternative explanation, we measured the extent to which dyads felt cohesive. 
Supplementary analyses revealed that within the dyad conditions cohesion was not 
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correlated with yielding. This suggests that rather than wishing to maintain cohesion, 
dyads may reject outside information simply because they do not believe it adds value.  
Many of our most important decisions are made collaboratively, following the 
intuition that “two heads are better than one.” Every aspect of law, policy and corporate 
governance relies on the ability of individuals to jointly make effective judgments. Our 
study demonstrates that collaborators’ reluctance to integrate external input may severely 
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 Table 1: Estimation items and correct answers. 
 
Question Text Answer 
What percentage of Americans own pets? 63.0% 
What percentage of members of Congress are Catholic? 30.1% 
In the 2008 presidential election, what percent of voting-age citizens 
voted? 
64.0% 
What percentage of students who entered the high school class of 2002 
left high school with a regular diploma? 
71.0% 
In the United States, what percentage of homeless men are veterans? 40.0% 
What percent of all U.S. undergraduates received some type of financial 
aid in 2007–08? 66.0% 
What percentage of the population in the District of Columbia is white? 38.5% 
In 2008, what percentage of corporate officers in Fortune 500 
companies were women? 15.7% 
What percent of homes with an iPad have two or more tablets? 17.0%  
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Table 2: Summary statistics by condition for yielding, confidence, and estimation error. 
 
Condition 



























































1  The discrepancy between participants’ and advisors’ initial estimates were not significantly different 
between conditions. 
 
   
